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ABSTRACT—Several paradigms show that responses to one event
compromise responses to a second event for around 500 ms.
Such effects are generally attributed to attentional capacity
limitations associated with processing information in the first
event. In a task in which targets could be distinguished only by
their meaning, we varied the semantic relationship between
distractors and targets following at different lags. Semantic
relatedness alone produced a classic attentional blink. We con-
clude by discussing how attention theory might best accom-
modate these new effects.
Attention mechanisms select salient events. People selectively attend
to their names (Moray, 1959), and anxious individuals show increased
sensitivity to threat words (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Mostly,
people attend to things that matter for their current goals (Duncan,
2000), and what ‘‘matters’’ in laboratory paradigms is determined by
experimental instructions about how to respond to particular stimulus
properties, either in static arrays or as events dynamically unfold over
time.
Several paradigms show that responses to one event compromise
responses to a second event. These paradigms include the psycho-
logical refractory period (Pashler & Johnson, 1998), task switching
during rapid word sequences (Allport, Styles, & Hseih, 1994), and the
attentional blink (AB). In the latter paradigm, participants watch
items presented at a rate of around 10 items/s. It is a divided-attention
task, involving two targets, each requiring a different response. For
example, participants might have to report a white letter (T1) em-
bedded in a stream of black letters, and then report whether a probe
(T2), such as the letter X, occurs subsequently. Given correct report of
T1, detection of T2 is impaired for about 500 ms (Raymond, Shapiro,
& Arnell, 1992). There are now several accounts of this effect (e.g.,
see Shapiro, Arnell, & Raymond, 1997). All assume that allocating
attention to T1 leaves less attention for T2, although the various
theories differ in the precise mechanisms, stages, or storage compo-
nents proposed.
Attention to meaning is also selective. When asked, ‘‘How many
animals of each type did Moses take into the Ark?’’ respondents
frequently answer, ‘‘Two,’’ apparently failing to access their knowledge
that the agent was really Noah (Erickson & Mattson, 1981). They do
not make this mistake when ‘‘Nixon’’ is substituted for ‘‘Moses.’’ The
effect occurs because both Moses and Noah fit the generic schema
‘‘male Old Testament figure with two-syllable name.’’ The question
focuses attention on number rather than agent identity. Because
‘‘Moses’’ is compatible with the evolving biblical schema, ‘‘Ark’’ can
pass along the conveyor belt of semantic interpretation without de-
tailed scrutiny of its antecedent. Its occurrence following ‘‘Nixon’’
requires attention.
Selective attention to events and to meaning may be connected.
Whatever the task, incoming information must be evaluated against
some mental representation of relevant knowledge. In classic visual
attention tasks, that knowledge is given by task instruction that spec-
ifies how to respond to particular contingencies. The mental rep-
resentations for contingencies in dual-task paradigms such as the AB
would be more elaborate than the representations of tasks requiring
the detection of a single target with a particular physical property.
Given that physical properties can be mapped onto their semantic
counterparts, capacity limitations in visual attention need not nec-
essarily arise from a classic bottleneck. As with the Moses effect, they
may be determined in the natural course of matching the semantic
representations of incoming items to semantic representations of the
relevant response contingencies.
Although associative meaning (Maki, Frigen, & Paulsen, 1997) and
personal salience (Shapiro, Caldwell, & Sorensen, 1997) influence
report of T2 in the AB paradigm, research has overwhelmingly relied
on using perceptual attributes, such as color, to distinguish at least
one of the targets from other presented items. Hence, task-salient
items have been directly tied to perceptual features. The idea that the
effects might be underpinned by processing task- and stimulus-related
meaning suggests that the blink itself should require neither distin-
guishing perceptual features nor dividing attention between two re-
sponses. All that should be required are conditions in which the
semantic properties of one event are salient to the response con-
tingency for a subsequent event.
METHOD
In the present study, lists of 35 words were presented at a rate of
110 ms/item, with one word replacing another with no interstimulus
interval (ISI). Most words referred to things or events occurring in
natural environments (e.g., island, snowstorm). Participants were
instructed to report a single target, a word that referred to a job or
profession that people engage in for pay (e.g., banker, shepherd,
waitress). On test trials, these targets were preceded at varying serial
positions by a potential distractor word, and the semantic relationship
between distractor and target was varied (see Fig. 1).
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In the high-salience condition, distractors conformed to the schema
‘‘property of human agent,’’ but referred to things for which people are
not paid (e.g., shopper, coward, witness). These distractors were ex-
pected to attract attention and compromise target detection. In a
second condition, household items (e.g., freezer, cupboard, wireless)
were the distractors. This condition was included so we could assess
any effects of category change from the stream of nature words, but
with distractors having lower salience to targets. Although associated
with human activity, these distractors were expected to attract less
attention because they are inanimate. To maximize impact, we pre-
sented each distractor only once, whereas nature words occurred many
times across lists. In the control condition, distractors were a subset of
nature words, each occurring once only, so we could assess any effects
of distractor novelty.
There were 42 distractors of each type and 42 targets. The four sets
were matched for word frequency (Mdn 5 3), and length (M 5 7.8
letters). To eliminate superficial cues, we used a variety of word
endings, and all sets had comparable distributions of endings. Dis-
tractors were presented at one of six positions (5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15).
Targets occurred at one of seven positions after the distractor (1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 7, 9). At least 11 items followed the target.
There were 42 trials in each condition, representing every combi-
nation of distractor position and lags to target. Another 42 trials as-
sessed performance when no distractor was presented. On 21 of these
trials, neither a distractor nor a target occurred; on the other 21 trials,
a target occurred, with no distractor, at Position 6, 12, or 24 of the list.
Trial order was randomized, as was the selection of distractors and
targets.
Thirty participants (23 female; mean age 5 33.1 years) gave in-
formed consent. They were asked to respond by reporting the identity
of the job in each list; they were told to say ‘‘no’’ when they did not see
a job and to say ‘‘yes’’ when they were confident they saw a job but
could not report its identity. There were 19 practice trials using dif-
ferent distractor words and targets.
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Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the task. C5 control condition; HS5 high-salience condition; LS5 low-salience condition; SOA5 stimulus-onset
asynchrony.
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At the end, participants completed a questionnaire, followed by an
unexpected recognition test. For the test, 60 words were presented in
random order, and participants were asked to judge whether each
word had occurred in the earlier lists. There was no time limit for
response. The test included 10 old and 10 new items for each dis-
tractor type.
RESULTS
On trials with no distractor, correct report of the target’s identity
averaged 67%. Correct report of no job seen averaged 85% when no
target occurred. False positive reports that a job was seen accounted
for 11% of responses. The error rate, report of words that were not
targets, was 3% in the control and low-salience conditions. In the
high-salience condition, the error rate was 6%, the increase due to
reports of the distractor itself.
The percentage of correct report of targets is shown in Figure 2.
There were main effects of condition, F(2, 60)530.9, p < .001, and
position, F(6, 180)5 9.8, p < .001, and an interaction between the
two, F(12, 360)53.5, p< .001. The control condition showed no blink
effect (i.e., no effect of serial position) at all, F(6, 180)51.75, p > .1.
A shallow blink followed low-salience distractors, F(1, 30)512.6, p<
.01, for quadratic fit. Accurate report in this condition (M561%) was
at a similar level to that following novel nature words (i.e., control
condition, M 5 64%). A substantial blink followed high-salience
distractors, F(1, 30)5 39.0 for quadratic fit and F(1, 30)5 23.4 for
cubic fit, both ps < .001. The presence of a deeper blink for the high-
salience than the low-salience distractors was confirmed by the
presence of a significant Serial Position  Condition interaction
when these two conditions were compared directly, F(6, 180)52.29,
p < .05.
In addition to correctly reporting a target’s identity, participants
could report total unawareness (‘‘no’’) or awareness of presence but not
identity (‘‘yes’’). For both these measures, there were reliable effects of
condition, F(2, 60)514.5, p < .001, for ‘‘no’’ responses and F(2, 60)5
10.9, p < .01, for ‘‘yes’’ responses, as well as position, F(6, 180)54.3,
p < .001, for ‘‘no’’ responses and F(6, 180)56.2, p < .01, for ‘‘yes’’
responses. In addition, the condition-by-position interaction was sig-
nificant for both ‘‘no’’ responses, F(12, 360)52.9, p < .01, and ‘‘yes’’
responses, F(12, 360) 5 2.02, p < .05. Figure 3 suggests that the
deeper blink Figure 2 shows for the high-salience condition is mostly
due to a greater lack of awareness for high-salience than low-salience
distractors across Positions 2, 3, and 4.
In the recognition test (Table 1), nature words were equally likely to
be judged old or new. There was a bias toward judging high- and low-
salience distractors as new. Signal detection analysis showed that
detection was higher with high-salience than low-salience distractors,
t(29)5 3.4, p < .01. There was no difference in bias for these con-
ditions, t(29)51.04, p5 .5. These results corroborate more extensive
processing of the high-salience than the low-salience distractors.
Just as threatening material attracts attention, so human agents
might inherently be more salient than inanimate distractors. To
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Fig. 2. Percentage of correct report of a target’s identity across serial positions. The two points for the no-distractor baseline
are for early (average of absolute serial positions 6 and 12) and late (absolute position 24) targets. C5 control condition;
HS5high-salience condition; LS5 low-salience condition.
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Fig. 3. Percentage of reports of ‘‘no job seen’’ (a) and ‘‘yes, I saw a job’’ (b) across serial positions. C5 control
condition; HS5high-salience condition; LS5 low-salience condition.
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eliminate this explanation, we repeated the procedure with 30 new
participants. The same distractor categories were used, but targets
were animals, again matched for length, frequency, and word endings.
Accurate report in all three conditions (Fig. 4) was at a level com-
parable to the level of the control and low-salience conditions of the
first experiment. There was no differential effect of the type of dis-
tractor, F(12, 360)5 0.81, p5 .64, for the interaction of condition
and position. Thus, the effect obtained in the main experiment can
be attributed to the semantic relationship between distractors and
targets.
MODELING MEANING
The blink we found followed a time course similar to that for standard
effects, but in a paradigm in which perceptual features do not identify
distractors and there is no requirement for two responses. Distractors
belonging to a salient category were processed more extensively than
distractors from a less salient one. One issue to resolve is whether
influences such as lexical priming played a part in determining the
effect, or whether it can be explained by semantic and executive
mechanisms alone, and if so, how?
Priming effects could have operated during word recognition. Pos-
itive priming of targets occurs when their meaning is associated with
earlier items, though reported effects are of short duration (Maki,
Frigen, & Paulsen, 1997). Our instructions might have lowered
thresholds for all words associated with jobs or occupations. The
human distractors would then have been more likely than household
items to rise above threshold, gain access to central mechanisms, and
thus cause a blink. Alternatively, it could be argued that processing of
distractors, which do not require a response, made the task analogous
to settings in which negative priming occurs (Tipper & Driver, 1988).
According to this reasoning, human distractors would have inhibited
subsequent job words, reducing the likelihood of their rising above
threshold. Both arguments would predict that lack of awareness would
rise with increasing semantic relatedness between distractors and
targets.
Similar predictions would be made by other theories. If transient
conceptual storage (Potter, 1999) and capacity-limited processing are
required to consolidate incoming information for report (Chun &
Potter, 1995), then the higher the semantic relatedness between the
distractor and target category, the greater the likelihood a distractor
would progress toward consolidation for report or interfere in con-
ceptual storage.
TABLE 1
Recognition Memory for Distractors
Condition Detection sensitivity (d0) Bias (b)
Control (nature) 0.17 1.02
Low-salience (household) 0.17 1.59
High-salience (human) 0.69 1.34
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Fig. 4. Percentage of correct report of animal targets across serial positions in the follow-up experiment. C5 control
condition; HS5high-salience condition; LS5 low-salience condition.
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Latent semantic analysis (LSA; Landauer & Dumais, 1997) can be
used to evaluate whether the explanations discussed in the preceding
paragraphs are viable explanations of our results. LSA is based on word
occurrence in huge corpora. Words with similar meaning occur in
similar contexts. LSA uses this fact to index the association of the
constructs underlying word use by creating a high-dimensional math-
ematical space onto which individual words, groups of words, or texts
can be mapped. LSA approximates similarity in meaning by computing
how far apart items or texts are in semantic space. The closer they are,
the more similar they are in meaning or in their associations to related
knowledge. Similarity is indexed by the cosine of their relationship
coded on 300 dimensions, a measure that ranges between 1 and11.
There is good evidence that this measure has considerable validity. It
systematically relates to many behavioral effects that depend on simi-
larities in meaning (Landauer & Dumais, 1997).
Using LSA, we examined similarity relations among the distractor
categories and between the categories and their exemplars. Similarities
were computed by taking all items in a category as a pool. We included
four additional pools of 10 words to capture generic schema that might
be required in response selection. One pool represented human agents
(human, people, mankind, womankind, someone, mortal, fellow, sen-
tient, folk, soul). The second represented work at a more generic level
than the individual target words (occupation, profession, job, trade,
employment, work, business, career, livelihood, vocation). The third
represented getting paid for work (payment, fee, remuneration, rec-
ompense, bribe, salary, honorarium, income, earnings, wages). The final
pool included generic references to household goods (ornament, device,
utensil, gadget, tool, possession, decoration, fitting, fixture, furnishing).
The matrix obtained made sense (Table 2). Distractors and targets all
showed low similarities to nature words. Human (high-salience) and
household (low-salience) distractors showed high similarities to their
superordinate schema pools. However, high- and low-salience distractors
showed rather strong and equal levels of association to the job targets, as
well as a lower and equal level of association with generic occupation
words. These results are understandable because LSA captures knowl-
edge through the occurrence of concepts across a wide range of contexts,
and these pools are all related to human activity. All distractors and
targets had low levels of association with generic payment words.
Payment was closely associated only with generic occupation words.
More extensive processing of the high-salience than the low-salience
distractors may have been related not simply to a ‘‘human’’ feature, but to
the ease of accessing knowledge about occupations and payment.
To further explore relationships between LSA cosines, we con-
ducted a by-item analysis. We identified which of the high-salience
distractors were associated with above-, on-, and below-median use of
each type of response (correct identity, ‘‘no,’’ and ‘‘yes’’). The numbers
of distractors in each range and their associated levels of usage are
shown in Table 3. We then calculated the cosines to generic categories
and specific targets for the pools of distractors with above-, on-, and
below-median usage (Table 4). The similarities revealed two striking
patterns. First, similarities were lower for above-median correct report
than for below-median correct report. The cosines for household (low-
salience) distractors in Table 2 are .34 for the human category, .28 for
the occupation category, and .43 for job targets. Human distractors
with the highest levels of correct report of targets had the same level of
similarity, or lower similarity, compared with the pooled household
items. The implication is clear: Those human distractors most likely to
result in accurate report would have been unlikely to stand out as
salient in terms of either their generic semantic properties or their
similarities to specific targets.
Second, use of ‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’ responses showed different patterns
on the human and occupation dimensions. Above-median use of ‘‘yes’’
was linked to a profile of high similarities and below-median use to a
profile of lower similarities. This would be expected if failure to report
were simply the opposite of the pattern for accurate report. However,
the profiles for above- and below-median use of ‘‘no’’ were not unlike
those for accurate report. Examination of the words in each pool
confirmed that this was due to differential migration of distractors from
one range to another. Of the 19 words in the pool for above-median use
TABLE 2
Cosines Obtained in the Latent Semantic Analysis
Category
Generic
human
Generic
occupation
Generic
payment
Generic
household
Target
jobs
High-salience
(human)
Low-salience
(household)
Control
(nature)
(n5 10) (n5 10) (n5 10) (n5 10) (n5 41) (n5 40) (n5 36) (n5 40)
Generic occupation .32 1
Generic payment .11 .38 1
Generic household .30 .23 .08 1
Target jobs .36 .47 .15 .30 1
High-salience (human) .50 .29 .12 .25 .47 1
Low-salience (household) .34 .28 .06 .44 .43 .35 1
Control (nature) .22 .10 .01 .09 .14 .17 .18 1
Note. One target, 2 human, 6 household, and 2 nature words had no entry in the analysis.
TABLE 3
Numbers of Human High-Salience Distractors Giving Rise to
Above-, Below-, and On-Median Use of Each Type of Response
to the Targets
Range of use
Response to target
Correct identity ‘‘No’’ ‘‘Yes’’
Above median 15 (56) 16 (36) 19 (28)
Median 7 (47) 10 (27) 7 (20)
Below median 18 (38) 14 (19) 14 (11)
Note. The numbers in parentheses show the percentage use of each response
type for distractors in a given usage category.
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of ‘‘yes,’’ only 4 were in the pool of 16 showing above-median use of
‘‘no.’’ To test the significance of the asymmetry, we computed an LSA
cosine for each word in relation to a semantic specification of the
target profile, this time defined by the exact text of the experimental
instructions describing the target category, and corrected the cosines
for vector length. Excluding the 4 shared items, words with above-
median use of ‘‘yes’’ were more similar to the generic description
of targets than were words with above-median use of ‘‘no,’’ w2(1, N5
27)5 6.24, p5 .013.
DISCUSSION
LSA revealed that participants, when unable to report identity, were
more aware of target presence (indexed by ‘‘yes’’ responses, Table 4)
following human distractors with relatively high similarity to the tar-
gets than following distractors with relatively low similarity to targets.
However, participants were also more unaware of target presence
(indexed by ‘‘no’’ responses, Table 4) following human distractors with
relatively low similarity to the targets than following distractors with
high similarity to targets. Arguments based on lexical priming, or on
simple interference effects in conceptual storage, do not have ready-
made explanations for this pattern. Similarities should have been
higher for ‘‘no’’ responses than for ‘‘yes’’ responses, and above-median
use of ‘‘no’’ should have been linked to higher similarities between
distractors and targets than below-median use of ‘‘no.’’
The results appear more readily explicable in terms of two stages of
semantic interpretation in which rapidly extracted generic properties
of the incoming stream are being monitored. In this specific case, if
the generic meaning of an item was discrepant with the schema of
‘‘stuff in natural environments,’’ then that item was examined in re-
lation to a generic schema for ‘‘human occupation with possible re-
muneration associations.’’ An item whose meaning was similar to this
schema was marked as salient, and this triggered a second stage to
establish its specific referential meaning and whether that meaning
involved paid work. The first stage is rather like taking a ‘‘glance’’ at
generic meaning, and the second stage is like taking a closer ‘‘look’’ at
the more precise semantic relationship between a distractor and the
semantic specification of targets. If semantic processes cannot glance
at incoming items while looking at another, a blink would result.
Neither household items nor human distractors with low similarities to
the target schema would have stood out as salient in the initial glance.
Like the occurrence of ‘‘Ark’’ after ‘‘Moses,’’ they would have passed
along the conveyor belt of semantic interpretation without detailed
scrutiny.
Having reached the second stage, any human distractors that are
highly similar to targets would again have an advantage. The semantic
profile for these words most clearly signposts the way to occupation
relatedness, and Table 2 shows that knowledge about payment needed
to reject a distractor as a ‘‘job’’ is closely associated only with occu-
pation relatedness. Hence, in the present experiment, the subset of
human distractors with high similarities should have been rejected
rapidly, allowing relatively fast return to monitoring for targets. For
distractors with lower similarities, access to pertinent knowledge
about payment would have been poorly signposted in semantic space,
the process of rejection would have been more protracted, and target
detection would have been compromised for a longer duration. This
more protracted process would be associated with greater unaware-
ness of targets, indexed by the use of ‘‘no’’ responses, while those
human distractors of lower similarity to targets underwent detailed
scrutiny.
Our results show accurate report of a target when it immediately
follows a distractor, a characteristic known as lag-1 sparing. This
usually occurs in AB studies in which no attentional switch is re-
quired or the switch is unidimensional (Visser, Bischof, & Di Lollo,
1999). Think of a semantic analogue of glancing over objects in a
dynamically changing visual scene. A distractor may be the topic of a
glance while a subsequent item that also has a salient semantic profile
moves onto the contemporaneous semantic scenery, enabling an im-
mediate switch from glancing at one item to looking at the temporally
adjacent item, and hence lag-1 sparing. Awareness that a probable
target has just co-occurred—something more like a temporal analogue
of peripheral vision—could instead precipitate successive glances
rather than a glance followed by a look. With successive glances, the
wider cognitive system might well, on some occasions, reconfigure its
processes to access a current representation of the visual form of a
distractor rather than relying on its meaning. The initial glance would
lead to a sense of knowing that a target had been present, and hence
the association of imprecise awareness with failed attempts to recover
visual form fits the pattern of ‘‘yes’’ responses following human dis-
tractors. ‘‘Yes’’ was more frequently used in response to distractors
with high similarity to targets than in response to those with low sim-
ilarities, a result consistent with the proposed mechanism of glanc-
ing. ‘‘Yes’’ responses also contributed to accurate identification
falling short of baseline levels at the longest lags. Any extensive re-
configurations of processing that fail to recover the actual visual form
of the target would be linked to more protracted diversions of attention
than those required for a closely coupled semantic glance and look.
Few current models focused specifically on mechanisms of visual
attention have much to say about the exact part played by representations
TABLE 4
Latent Semantic Analysis Cosines for Pools of Human (High-Salience) Distractors With Above-, On-, and Below-Median Use
of Each Response
Range of use
Response to target
Correct identity ‘‘No’’ ‘‘Yes’’
Human Occupation Pay Jobs Human Occupation Pay Jobs Human Occupation Pay Jobs
Above median .35 .19 .06 .32 .38 .23 .11 .37 .52 .27 .09 .48
On median .41 .17 .08 .39 .40 .16 .08 .33 .37 .25 .13 .37
Below median .46 .30 .14 .45 .45 .29 .10 .47 .33 .20 .09 .33
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of meaning and task knowledge. Those that do make reference to such
concerns are typically those that address the wider architectural
picture in cognition (Meyer & Kieras, 1997; Potter, 1999; Shallice,
1988). Barnard (1999) proposed that executive functions are fulfilled
by two subsystems specialized to process generic and specific types of
meaning. These two types of meaning can be linked directly to the
glance-and-look explanation of blink effects offered here, as well as to
analogous effects in question answering (Scott, Barnard, & May,
2001). We thus conclude that semantic representations can play a
substantial role in the allocation of visual attention over time.
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